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Abstract
An elementary model is given which shows how an objective (hence
local and noncontextual) picture of the microworld can be constructed
without conflicting with quantum mechanics (QM). This contradicts
known no-go theorems, which however do not hold in the model, and
supplies some suggestions for a broader theory in which QM can be
embedded.
PACS numbers: 03.65.w, 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ud.
According to the standard (Copenhagen) interpretation, quantum me-
chanics (QM) is nonobjective, which can be briefly expressed by saying that “a
measurement does not, in general, reveal a preexisting value of the measured
property”(1). Though accepted by generations of physicists, nonobjectivity
implies a number of nonintuitive consequences and puzzling paradoxes, which
spread out from QM to all theories based on it. However, it is strongly sup-
ported by a number of arguments, among which Bell-Kochen-Specker’s(2),(3)
and Bell’s(4),(5). These are usually seen as no-go theorems which show that a
noncontextual and local (hence objective) picture of the microworld cannot
be consistent with QM, so that one must come to terms with the paradoxes
following from nonobjectivity.
The elementary set-theoretical model provided here aims to show that
the above conclusion can be circumvented without altering the formalism
and the minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM. The resulting objective
picture, despite its simplicity, has some deep theoretical implications, that
will be briefly expounded and commented on at the end.
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To begin with, let us accept the standard notion of state of a physical
system S as a class of physically equivalent preparing devices.(6) Further-
more, let us call physical object any individual sample x of S obtained by
activating a preparing device, and say that x is in the state S (at time t) if
the device pi preparing x (at t) belongs to S. Whenever S is a microscopic
physical system, let us introduce a set E of microscopic physical properties f,
g, ..., characterizing S, which play the role of theoretical entities. For every
physical object x, every property f ∈ E is associated with x in a dichotomic
way, so that one briefly says that every f ∈ E either is possessed or it is not
possessed by x. The set F0 of all macroscopic properties is then introduced
as in standard QM, that is, it is defined as the set of all pairs of the form
(A0,∆), where A0 is an observable (that is, a class of physically equivalent
measuring apparatuses) with spectrum Λ0, and ∆ a Borel set on the real
line (for every observable A0, different sets containing the same subset of Λ0
obviously define physically equivalent properties). Yet, every observable A0
is obtained from a suitable observable A of standard QM by adding to the
spectrum Λ of A a further outcome a0 that does not belong to Λ, called the
no-registration outcome of A0 (note that such an outcome can be introduced
also within the standard quantum measurement theory, but it plays here a
different theoretical role), so that Λ0 = Λ∪{a0}. The set E of all microscopic
properties is then assumed to be in one-to one correspondence with the sub-
set F ⊆ F0 of all macroscopic properties of the form F = (A0,∆), where A0
is an observable and a0 /∈ ∆.
Basing on the above definitions and assumptions, one can provide the
following description of the measurement process. Whenever a physical ob-
ject x is prepared by a given device pi in a state S, and A0 is measured by
means of a suitable apparatus, the set of microscopic properties possessed by
x produces a probability (which is either 0 or 1 if the model is deterministic)
that the apparatus does not react, so that the outcome a0 may be obtained.
In this case, x is not detected and one cannot get any explicit information
about the microscopic physical properties possessed by x. If, on the contrary,
the apparatus reacts, an outcome different from a0, say a, is obtained, and
one is informed that x possesses all microscopic properties associated with
macroscopic properties of the form F = (A0,∆), where ∆ is a Borel set such
that a0 /∈ ∆ and a ∈ ∆ (for the sake of brevity we also say that x possesses
all macroscopic properties as F in this case).
In order to place properly quantum probability within the above intuitive
picture, let us consider a preparing device pi ∈ S that is activated repeatedly.
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In this case a (finite) set S of physical objects in the state S is prepared.
Then, let us partition S into subsets S(1), S(2), ..., S(n), such that in each
subset all objects possess the same microscopic properties, and assume that
a measurement of an observable A0 is done on every object. Furthermore,
let us introduce the following symbols.
N: number of physical objects in S.
N0: number of physical objects in S that are not detected.
N(i): number of physical objects in S(i).
N
(i)
0 : number of physical objects in S
(i) that are not detected.
N
(i)
F : number of physical objects in S
(i) that possess the macroscopic
property F = (A0,∆) corresponding to the microscopic property f.
It is apparent that the number N
(i)
F either coincides with N
(i)−N
(i)
0 or with
0. The former case occurs whenever f is possessed by the objects in S(i), since
all objects that are detected then yield outcome in ∆. The latter case occurs
whenever f is not possessed by the objects in S(i), since all objects that are
detected then yield outcome different from a0 but outside ∆. In both cases
one generally gets N(i)−N
(i)
0 6= 0 (even if N
(i)−N
(i)
0 = 0 may also occur, in
particular in a deterministic model), so that the following equation holds:
N
(i)
F
N(i)
=
N(i)−N
(i)
0
N(i)
N
(i)
F
N(i)−N
(i)
0
. (1)
The term on the left in Eq. (1) represents the frequency of objects pos-
sessing the property F in S(i), the first term on the right the frequency of
objects in S(i) that are detected, the second term (which either is 1 or 0) the
frequency of objects that possess the property F in the subset of all objects
in S(i) that are detected.
The frequency of objects in S that possess the property F is given by
1
N
∑
iN
(i)
F =
N−N0
N
(
∑
i
N
(i)
F
N−N0
) . (2)
Let us assume now that all frequencies converge in the large number limit,
so that they can be substituted by probabilities, and that these probabilities
do not depend on the choice of the preparing device pi in S. Hence, if one
considers the large number limit of Eq. (1), one gets
P
(i)t
S (F ) = P
(i)d
S
(F )P
(i)
S (F ) , (3)
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where P
(i)t
S (F ) is the overall probability that a physical object x possessing
the microscopic properties that characterize S(i) also possess the property
F, P
(i)d
S (F ) is the probability that x be detected when F is measured on it,
P
(i)
S (F ) (which either is 0 or 1) is the probability that x possess the property
F when detected. Moreover, the large number limit of Eq. (2) yields
P tS(F ) = P
d
S
(F )PS(F ) , (4)
where P tS(F ) is the overall probability that a physical object x in a state S
possess the property F, PdS(F ) is the probability that x be detected when
F is measured on it, PS(F ) is the probability that x possess the property F
when detected. It is then reasonable to identify PS(F ) with the quantum
probability that a physical object in the state S possess the property F, so
that PS(F ) can be evaluated by following the rules of standard QM, hence
in particular representing any state S by means of a trace class operator on a
Hilbert space H associated with S and any macroscopic property that cor-
responds to a microscopic property by means of a projection operator on H.
Thus, one need not modifying the formalism and the statistical interpretation
of standard QM.
As anticipated at the beginning, however, the set-theoretical model illus-
trated above provides an objective (hence local and noncontextual) picture
of the microworld which is consistent with QM. Indeed, for every physical
object x in the state S, every macroscopic property of the form F = (A0,∆)
(where a0 may belong or not to ∆) either is possessed or is not possessed by
x, and the probability that it is possessed/not possessed is determined by the
microscopic properties possessed by x, which do not depend on the measur-
ing apparatus (hence microscopic properties play in the model a role similar
to states in objective local theories(7)). This violates standard expectations
and can be explained as follows.
The Hilbert space formalism of standard QM does not associate any math-
ematical object with the microscopic properties f, g, ... Furthermore, pro-
jection operators represent only macroscopic properties of the form (A0,∆),
where A0 is an observable and a0 /∈ ∆, so that the mathematical representa-
tion of the entities appearing in the model is only partial. Hence, every QM
law stated by means of the standard formalism necessarily relates (possibly
probabilistically) only entities that are mathematically represented, that is,
states and macroscopic properties of the form specified above. If the law
is interpreted in the observative language of the theory, it may undergo a
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process of empirical verification, and one can classify it as empirical. Yet,
because of the above remarks, such a law refers only to objects that are de-
tected; moreover, it can be actually verified only in those physical situations
in which the verification procedure does not lead to simultaneous measure-
ments of noncommeasurable observables. If these restrictive conditions are
satisfied, the relations among macroscopic properties established by the law
match analogous relations among the corresponding microscopic properties.
If, on the contrary, the restrictive conditions are not satisfied, one can neither
assert the validity of the relations predicted by the law among macroscopic
properties, nor transfer these relations to microscopic properties. As an ex-
ample, think of a physical object x on which an observable A0 is measured,
obtaining outcome a0. In this case, no macroscopic property of the form
(A0,∆), with a0 /∈ ∆, is possessed by x, hence no non-trivial relation among
properties of this form holds, and no relation among the microscopic prop-
erties possessed by x can be inferred from quantum laws (but the model
predicts that microscopic properties must be such that the probability of the
a0 outcome is not 0).
The above arguments point out that quantum laws must be handled with
care within the model. In particular, consider the condition stated by Kochen
and Specker (briefly, KS)(3) as a basic premise for the Bell-KS theorem, that
can be reformulated as follows.(1)
If a set of mutually commuting observables A, B, C, ... satisfies a relation
of the form f(A, B, C, ...) = 0 then the values v(A), v(B), v(C), ... assigned
to them in an individual system must also be related by
f(v(A), v(B), v(C), ...) = 0 . (5)
In all proofs of the Bell-KS theorem, the law (5) is applied repeatedly,
inserting in it different sets of mutually commuting observables, and there
are observables belonging to different sets that do not commute. This im-
plies that, if Eq. (5) is checked for a given choice of observables, checking it
(on the same objects) for a different choice requires simultaneous measure-
ments of noncommeasurable observables. Hence, one cannot assert that all
relations among macroscopic properties established by equations of the form
(5) are bound to hold simultaneously, nor that they can be translated into
relations among the corresponding microscopic properties. This invalidates
the premises on which the Bell-KS theorem stands, which explains how the
model can circumvent this theorem and provide a noncontextual picture of
the microscopic world.
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Similar reasonings apply if Bell’s inequalities are considered. These are
usually maintained to show that QM is a nonlocal theory (Bell’s theorem).
Let us refer, for the sake of simplicity, to the inequalities propounded by
Clauser et al. in 1969 (CHSH’s inequalities).(5) Then, the quantum inequal-
ities corresponding to CHSH’s inequalities relate (dichotomic) observables,
hence macroscopic properties, and can be checked. However, the check is not
trivial, since the inequalities contain noncommeasurable observables, so that
they can be checked only “by blocks”, that is, measuring different correlation
functions on different sets of physical objects, all in the same state. But this
procedure considers in every set only the objects that are actually detected,
and the frequencies that are obtained must be interpreted in terms of proba-
bilities of the form PS(F ) (see Eq. 4), that are related as in QM, not in terms
of probabilities of microscopic properties that do not appear in the formalism
of QM. On the other side CHSH’s inequalities can be interpreted in the model
as relating correlation functions of microscopic properties possessed by the
physical objects, hence need not coincide with the corresponding quantum
inequalities. This illustrates how the model can circumvent the Bell theorem
and provide a local picture of the microscopic world.
The following remarks point out some further features of the model.
(i) From the viewpoint of the model, QM is a theory that is incomplete in
several senses (it does not provide the probabilities P tS(F ) and P
d
S(F ) in Eq.
(4), it does not say anything about the distribution of microscopic properties
on physical objects in a given state whenever the objects are not detected,
etc.). This agrees with the conclusion of Einstein, Podolski and Rosen in
their famous paper(8), which was however discarded by most physicists in
favor of the opposite thesis upholded by Bohr. The model thus shows that
the EPR perspective was not necessarily inconsistent with QM. If this is
accepted, a broader theory embodying QM can be envisaged, according to
which the quantum probability PS(F ) is considered as a conditional rather
than an absolute probability (see Eq. (4)). It is then interesting to note that
Eq. (4) could also be obtained in the framework of a model which introduces
Pd
S
(F ) as efficiency of a non-ideal measuring apparatus, as in some existing
attempts of rescuing local realism by resorting to the low efficiencies of the
apparatuses in the existing experiments that confirm quantum inequalities
(see, e.g., Refs. 9 and 10). Yet, in a model of this kind the no-registration
outcome occurs because of flaws of the measuring apparatus, hence Pd
S
(F ) is
1 if ideal observables are considered. In the model presented here, instead,
the no-registration outcome may occur because of the microscopic properties
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of the physical object. Hence, Pd
S
(F ) may be less than 1 also in the case
of an ideal apparatus (indeed every pi in S prepares objects which do not
possess the same microscopic properties, and some objects may possess sets
of properties that make the detection of them by any apparatus measuring
F possible but not certain, or even impossible).
(ii) The microscopic properties f, g, ... are hidden parameters in the
model, but are not hidden variables in the standard sense. Indeed, it has been
shown above that they are not bound to make Eq. (5) valid in every physical
situation, which instead is required as a basic condition in the standard
definitions of hidden variables.(1),(3) This explains why microscopic properties
are not contextual, as standard hidden variables must be.
Finally, note that the model presented here can be placed within the
broader context of the objective interpretation of QM propounded by the
author (see, e.g., Refs. 11-15). However, it is sufficient by itself to open
some new interesting possibilities, that are usually ignored (or maintained
impossible) in the literature.
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